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Introduction1 
This review article is focused on Stephen Davies’ The Artful Species (2013) and 
investigates the close relationship between art and religion (or the arts and 
religions) in human culture and history. Davies’ account of the case of art-
making and aesthetics is compared with the case of religion in the model of 
human evolutionary development outlined in Religion in Human Evolution 
(2011), by the late Robert N. Bellah (1927-2013). Both Davies and Bellah 
explore the possibilities offered by an evolutionary biological understanding of 
these vital aspects of human existence, art and religion. Yet both Bellah and 
Davies stress that the cognitivist explanation of the origin and parallel functions 
of art and religion are also broadly compatible with the older social 
constructionist models. This article considers Davies’ assessment of cognitivist 
explanations of art (art as adaptation, art as a spandrel – an accidental by-product 
of adaptive evolutionary behaviour – and art as vestige, that is, enabled by 
evolution, but not itself evolutionary), and of the possibility that art is a cultural 
production that has no relationship to biology.  
The explanatory power of these models, when applied to ‘art’ or 
‘aesthetics’, is broadly comparable when ‘religion’ is substituted for ‘art’. I 
argue first, that both art and religion arise from play, and involve shared 
                                                 
Carole M. Cusack is a Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Sydney. 
1 I am grateful to my research assistant Venetia Robertson for library searches and note-
taking.  Thanks are due to Don Barrett for his sympathetic interest in my work and help 
with refining my ideas during the writing process. That his undergraduate Philosophy 
Major included a unit in Aesthetics is a bonus. 
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narratives and experiences of an order other than the quotidian. 2  Second, 
different types of social and political organizations will foster different types of 
art and religion. Third, certain religious practices bear a strong resemblance to 
art practices (especially the body-based performance variety), and that an 
examination of both kinds of practices aids in making transparent the processes 
underlying the origin and development of the arts and religions (out of narrative 
and play, via the intermediate stage of ritual). Finally, I consider the challenges 
posed by the ‘hard’ sciences to traditional Humanities disciplines like 
Philosophy and Religious Studies, and offer some remarks on the importance of 
what Thomas F. Gieryn termed “boundary work.”3 
 
A Brief Note On Traditional Aesthetics and Western Approaches to Art 
Since the term ‘aesthetics’ entered the vocabulary of philosophy in the 
eighteenth century has been regarded as a highly complex and contested area of 
inquiry. Derived from the concept of ‘taste’, aesthetics as a separate field sought 
to develop a response to Enlightenment rationalist notions of beauty and virtue 
that was empirically-based. James Shelley expresses the distinction thus: 
“[a]gainst rationalism about beauty, the eighteenth-century theory of taste held 
the judgment of beauty to be immediate; against egoism about virtue it held the 
pleasure of beauty to be disinterested.” 4  As a philosophical sub-discipline, 
aesthetics operates across four domains: those of objects, judgments, attitude, 
and experience. The aesthetic attitude involves disinterestedness, sympathy, 
attention, and contemplation.5  Aesthetic objects are frequently accorded the 
status of ‘art’, itself a problematic term, but which is here defined as “the 
expression of any ideal that the artist can realize in plastic form.”6 This is a useful 
definition as it does nor tether art to beauty, nor separate ‘fine’ from ‘applied’ 
art, nor does it make assumptions about the social status, gender, or motivations 
of the artist, apart from the notion that s/he was inspired to realize an ‘ideal’. 
                                                 
2 Carole M. Cusack, ‘Play, Narrative and the Creation of Religion: Extending the 
Theoretical Base of “Invented Religions” ’, Culture and Religion, vol. 14, no. 4 (2013), 
pp. 363-377. 
3 Thomas F. Gieryn, ‘Boundary Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-
Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists’, American 
Sociological Review, vol. 48, no. 6 (1983), pp. 781-795. 
4 James Shelley, ‘The Concept of the Aesthetic’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2013), at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-concept/. Accessed 13/12/2013. 
5 Jerome Stolnitz, ‘The Aesthetic Attitude’, in Introductory Readings in Aesthetics, ed. 
John Hospers (New York and London: The Free Press and Collier Macmillan, 1969), 
pp. 17-27.  
6 Herbert Read, The Meaning of Art (London: Faber and Faber, 1974 [1931]), p. 23.  
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Aesthetic judgment has been known since the philosophy of Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804) to be especially problematic, in that its “subjective character” 
nevertheless seeks “objective verification” in human nature or culture, raising 
the issue that values are situated in particular contexts, rather than being 
universal and applicable across all historical eras and cultures.7  
Aesthetic experience, the fourth domain, was initially explained by 
reference to the internalist model of Monroe C. Beardsley (1915-1985). 
Beardsley’s internalist theory was in essence a phenomenological account of 
aesthetic experience, positing that it possessed the three qualities; focus, 
intensity, and unity (which was subdivided into coherence and completeness). 
George Dickie (b. 1926) criticised Beardsley for failing to “distinguish between 
the features we experience aesthetic objects as having and the features aesthetic 
experiences themselves have.”8 As a result, in 1982 Beardsley put forward an 
externalist model. Externalism states that an aesthetic experience is just an 
experience with aesthetic content (that is, that is engendered by the object). This 
points to another problem, in that early philosophers of aesthetics were 
empiricists, and this remains discernible in the case of aesthetic judgements, 
briefly discussed above. Yet, aesthetic experience is generally now explained in 
externalist terms; that is, the qualities are inherent in the object, not in the 
experiencer. This is, in fact, a rationalist position: as Beardsley notes, the “three 
general critical standards, unity, complexity, and intensity” as qualities of the 
object contemplated are appealed to in almost all scholarship in the field of 
aesthetics.9  
In the mid-twentieth century aesthetics as a philosophical sub-discipline 
was attacked by scholars from Marxist and, more broadly, social-scientific 
backgrounds. Criticisms focused on the essentialism, psychologisation, and 
elitism of traditional approaches to art, and the theological contention that the 
making of art is akin to the action of God in the creation of the universe, which 
romanticises the figure of the artist as godlike.10  In 1970, Hanna Deinhard 
critiqued the assumption that art objects are perceived to be beautiful 
(aesthetically pleasing) across cultures and historical eras, and asserted that,  
[t]he point of departure of the sociology of art is the question: How 
is it possible that works of art, which always originate as products 
of human activity within a particular time and society and for a 
                                                 
7 Stefan Morawski, Inquiries Into the Fundamentals of Aesthetics (Cambridge, MA: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1974), p. 159. 
8 Shelley, ‘The Concept of the Aesthetic’. 
9 Monroe C. Beardsley, ‘Reasons in Aesthetic Judgments’, in Introductory Readings in 
Aesthetics, p. 253. 
10 Jean Duvignaud, The Sociology of Art (London: Paladin, 1972 [1967]), p. 24. 
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particular time, society, or function – even though they are not 
necessarily produced as ‘works of art’ – can live beyond their time 
and seem expressive and meaningful in completely different 
epochs and societies? On the other hand, how can the age and 
society that produced them be recognized in the works?11 
The continued relevance of this challenge, and the enduring value and 
effectiveness of broadly social constructionist or social-constructivist 
explanations of human activities is crucial to the argument of this article.  
Additionally, the dialogue between evolutionary biological explanations 
and social constructionism makes it possible to answer, even if tentatively, more 
basic questions that have recently arisen in the field of aesthetics. Shelley argues 
that these sceptical questions include, “whether any use of ‘aesthetic’ may be 
explicated without appeal to some other; whether agreement respecting any use 
is sufficient to ground meaningful theoretical agreement or disagreement; [and] 
whether the term ultimately answers to any legitimate philosophical purpose that 
justifies its inclusion in the lexicon?” 12  To put it slightly differently, is 
‘aesthetics’ so inherently compromised (as a term, a sub-field of philosophy, and 
a praxis) that it merits abandonment, or will new evidence (such as that provided 
by cognitive theorists or evolutionary biologists) reinstate its value and 
relevance? 
 
Evolutionary Explanations of Aesthetics and Art in The Artful Species 
(2013) 
In The Artful Species (2013) Stephen Davies explicitly sets out to investigate the 
role of aesthetic experience in the development of pre-human hominids and in 
the process of “prehistoric art creation by humans” (p. 5). This research aim 
necessitates a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of the connections 
between evolution, aesthetics, and art. Davies draws upon evolutionary 
psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, archaeology, ethology, philosophy, art 
history, musicology, and literary theory, to produce what is a wide-ranging and 
genuinely ground-breaking book. In Part I, ‘Key Concepts’, Davies is concerned 
to separate the notion of aesthetic experience from experiences that are merely 
pleasurable. He states that: 
I identify [the aesthetic] with the kind of experience to which it 
gives rise and with the kind of properties on which that experience 
focuses, these being in the most general classification those of 
beauty, the sublime, or their opposites. And I’ve rejected as too 
                                                 
11 Hanna Deinhard, Meaning and Expression: Towards a Sociology of Art (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1970), p. 3. 
12 Shelley, ‘The Concept of the Aesthetic’. 
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liberal the position that regards all pleasurable or unpleasurable 
perceptual experience as aesthetic (p. 15). 
From this starting point, Davies notes the Kantian idea that the aesthetic 
experience is ethical, in that the object is appreciated with disinterest, sketches 
the Deweyan notion that beauty may inhere in the mundane (as Damien Freeman 
puts it, the art experience is not separate from ordinary experience, but “is 
distinguished by the way in which the affective and perceptual parts of the 
ordinary experience are unified in a way that they are ordinarily not unified”),13 
and notes the aesthetic dimension of appreciating how a utilitarian object 
succeeds in successfully fulfilling its function. 
More important for the argument of The Artful Species are Davies’ 
considerations of how the aesthetic experience of art differs from that of the 
aesthetic experience of phenomena that are not art (non-human animals, 
landscapes, attractive humans, and so on). He notes that throughout history the 
aesthetic quality and the function of an art form (a ritual dance, a sculpture of a 
deity, and so on) were closely related. His definition of art is flexible and open-
ended, positing that a thing: 
is art (a) if it falls under an established, publicly recognised 
category of art or within an established art tradition, or (b) if it is 
intended by its maker/presenter to be art and its maker/presenter 
does what is necessary and appropriate to realising that intention, 
or (c) of it shows excellence of skill and achievement in realising 
significant aesthetic or artistic goals (pp. 28-9). 
Davies’ understanding of evolution is also important; he adheres to the view that 
human beings possess a dual inheritance from biology and culture, and that these 
two domains are mutually constitutive, and not separate and uninvolved. This 
section of the book concludes by questioning whether art is universal (focusing 
on music) and whether art is meaningful in cross-cultural contexts. 
Davies then discusses the three possible roles art and aesthetics might play 
in the evolutionary development of humans. The strongest position is that art is 
an adaptation, that it has “transmissible capacities that increased the fitness of 
those who displayed them;” in other words, that art and aesthetics optimised the 
process of evolution for humans (p. 45). The second position is that art and 
aesthetics are what the late Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin termed 
“spandrels,” that is, necessary by-products of evolutionarily adaptive 
phenomena that are not themselves adaptations.14 The third possibility is that art 
                                                 
13 Damien Freeman, Art’s Emotions: Ethics, Expression and Aesthetic Experience 
(Durham: Acumen, 2012), p. 4.  
14 Stephen J. Gould and Richard S. Lewontin, ‘The Spandrels of San Marco and the 
Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme’, Proceedings of the 
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and aesthetics are vestiges. Vestiges are things that were previously functional, 
but no longer are (like the human appendix). A final possibility, which is rejected 
by Davies, is that art and aesthetics are entirely cultural phenomena, and not 
connected to evolutionary biology. Anton Killin, in an insightful review essay 
dedicated to Davies, concurs: “there is good reason to be sceptical of views that 
treat biology and culture as causally independent especially with regards to 
ancient behaviours such as music, dance, painting, sculpture and fiction.”15 
Part II, ‘The Aesthetic’, is focused on three specific topics: human 
appreciation of animal beauty; the aesthetics of landscape; and aesthetic 
experience of human beauty. In the discussion of non-human animals, Davies 
notes that humans respond in various ways to the visual presentation of certain 
animals, and proposes that genetics may cause us to respond aesthetically to 
certain animals as an adaptive strategy, given their role in the lives of our 
ancestors (p. 72). Davies’ account of human aesthetic responses to landscape 
depends upon the ‘biophilia’ hypothesis of Roger Ulrich, that, 
certain advantages associated with natural settings during 
evolution were so critical for survival as to favour selection of 
individuals with a disposition to acquire, and then retain, various 
adaptive positive/approach responses to unthreatening natural  
configurations and elements. From this it follows as a remnant of 
evolution, modern humans might have a biologically prepared 
readiness to learn and persistently retain certain positive responses 
to nature but reveal no such preparedness for urban or modern 
elements.16 
The discussion of human beauty is broader than the traditional account (that of 
male appreciation of female sexual attractiveness), and Davies argues that 
evolutionary psychology prioritises the view that humans are drawn to signs of 
‘fitness’ (such as health, fertility, and so on) in potential mates. However, he 
asserts that the aesthetic response to other humans often involves factors other 
than sexual attractiveness, like “aspects of character, intellect, and spirituality” 
(p. 116).  
The core of the book is Part III, ‘The Arts’, which commences with an 
assessment of various theories of art and evolution (for example, that of Geoffrey 
                                                 
Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, vol. 205, no. 1161 (1979), pp. 
581-598. 
15 Anton Killin, ‘The Arts and Human Nature: Evolutionary Aesthetics and the 
Evolutionary Status of Art Behaviours’, Biology & Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 4 (2013), p. 
714. 
16 Roger S. Ulrich, ‘Biophilia, Biophobia, and Natural Landscapes’, in The Biophilia 
Hypothesis, eds Stephen R. Kellert and Edward. O. Wilson (Washington, DC: Island 
Press, 1993), p. 88. 
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Miller, who argues that the arts are adaptations for sexual display that resulted 
in the attraction of higher-quality mates, and Ellen Dissanayake, who claims that 
the creative act of making art “displays the hallmarks of a biological adaptation” 
and is a “source of intrinsic pleasure”) (pp. 124-130). Music is the chosen 
example of art practice, and Davies concludes that it is so varied a phenomenon 
that no simple explanation will satisfactorily explain it. Evolutionary psychology 
hypothesises that music arose in tandem with perceptual development, motor 
skill development, and trans-generational communication, but such a hypothesis 
does little or nothing to explain what music is, or to account for the varied roles 
it has played in human cultures (pp. 132-133). 
It seems that for Davies the evidence that art is adaptive is not persuasive. 
Yet music explained as a spandrel appears equally unsatisfactory. Here, Davies 
reveals his hand, arguing that the creation and appreciation of art was widespread 
in prehistory, and thus individuals who showed no interest in or appreciation of 
art products would have appeared ‘unfit’ and undesirable. He concludes that, 
[a]ny transmissible human form or behaviour that was recognised 
as signifying well-formedness and developmental normalcy 
would not only become statistically average as it successfully 
spread through the population; it would become normative in the 
evaluative sense, whether it first emerged as an adaptation or as a 
spandrel (p. 145). 
The arts as vestiges and as pure technologies are both models that Davies regards 
as unconvincing. He then uses the example of literature (as much evolutionary 
biological work on the arts as adaptations has concentrated on literature).17 Yet, 
in the book’s conclusion Davies is very wary of identifying music or literature 
as evolutionary adaptations, as for him the evidence simply was not strong 
enough (particularly with regard to the heritability of behaviours). 18  He 
concludes that the arts are most likely not to be adaptations, but to be by-products 
of adaptations for “intelligence, humour, sociality, emotionality, inventiveness 
and curiosity” (p. 185). This conclusion is weaker than those drawn by certain 
evolutionary biologists, yet is strong in that it certainly places art as central in 
both individual human psychology, and for group social development. These 
twin claims for art point to the role of religion, for which near-identical claims 
can be made.  
 
                                                 
17 See Brian Boyd, On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction 
(Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press, 2009). 
18 Justine Kingsbury, ‘Review of The Artful Species’, Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 91, no. 4 (2013), p. 805. 
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Parallels Between Art and Religion in Evolutionary Biological Models of 
Human Development 
The encroachment of evolutionary biology upon the traditional field of aesthetics 
is directly paralleled by a similar imperialist expansion by cognitivist scholars 
into the domain of Religious Studies. For approximately two decades, since the 
publication of Stewart Guthrie’s ‘A Cognitive Theory of Religion’ (1980), the 
‘new’ cognitivist approach to the origin of religion (hypothesised either as an 
adaptive behaviour that facilitated human evolution, or as a by-product – that is, 
a spandrel – of adaptive community building behaviours), has gained credibility 
and, arguably, is poised to become the scholarly orthodoxy of the coming 
decades.19 This methodological shift tends to be viewed sceptically by those 
whose allegiance to older theoretical models (often a motley crew with little in 
common, as they variously adhere to philological approaches, social 
constructivist methods, and a range of ‘postmodern’ positions, among other 
methodologies) is challenged by the new universalism of the common human 
evolutionary history and the common human cognitive architecture. However, it 
is possible to demonstrate that cognitivist theories of religion significantly 
overlap with older social constructivist (or constructionist) theories, and that 
Religious Studies as a field might be reinvigorated through dialogue with certain 
disciplines (principally evolutionary biology and psychology) that have 
traditionally been viewed as Science, rather than Humanities.  
The model of the origin and development of religion developed in the late 
Robert N. Bellah’s Religion in Human Evolution (2011) focuses particularly on 
the centrality of play, to establish three crucial propositions. The first of these is 
that play, narrative, and experiences of an order other than the quotidian are 
central to the emergence and maintenance of religion. The second is that 
different types of social organization and political organizations will foster 
different types of religion.20 Bellah argues that these are related to the four 
modes of human developmental psychology, characterized as unitive, enactive, 
symbolic and conceptual; thus, in important ways he re-establishes the notion 
that collective human social development parallels individual development 
(recalling, though in a looser, less prescriptive fashion, Ernst Haeckel’s claim 
                                                 
19 Stewart Guthrie, ‘A Cognitive Theory of Religion’, Current Anthropology, vol. 21, 
no. 2 (1980), pp. 181-194. See also Religious Narrative, Cognition and Culture: Image 
and Word in the Mind of Narrative, ed. Armin Geertz and Jeppe Sinding Jensen 
(Sheffield and Oakville, CT: Equinox, 2011). 
20 Robert N. Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial 
Age (Cambridge, MA and London, The Belknap Press, 2011). 
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that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny”). 21  Bellah’s model is significant 
because he links cognitive theories of religion to older social constructionist 
theories. Further, it closely parallels the application of evolutionary biology to 
the making of art and to aesthetics attempted by Stephen Davies in The Artful 
Species, discussed above. 
Bellah’s understanding of play relies on the classic account by Johan 
Huizinga, Homo Ludens (1938, English translation 1949). Language, myth and 
ritual, the “archetypal activities of human society,” are intimately related to play, 
and Huizinga builds a model of play that emphasises its voluntary and free 
nature, its capacity for seriousness despite its explicit lack of seriousness, its 
presumption of disinterest, its acknowledgement of “certain limits of time and 
space,” and its promotion of “the formation of social groupings which tend to 
surround themselves with secrecy and to stress their difference from the common 
world by disguise or other means.”22 In Religion in Human Evolution, Bellah 
improved upon Huizinga’s theory of play, employing evidence from a range of 
disciplines including evolutionary biology, psychology, and cognitive 
development. Where Huizinga merely claimed that different mental states are 
experienced within play, Bellah employs Abraham Maslow’s notion of 
Deficiency (D) cognition and Being (B) cognition, and argues that D-cognition 
can be equated to Alfred Schutz’s ‘daily life’, whereas B-cognition occurs when 
humans are motivated to participate rather than manipulate, and then experience 
the breakdown of the subject-object dichotomy and a sense of wholeness, 
conditions that manifest in situations in which religious experience is 
facilitated.23 He then argues that “unitive states” (in which the subject-object 
divide is erased, time is speeded up or slowed down, and language is inadequate 
to the task of describing what has happened), is the paradigmatic condition that 
underlies all ‘religious’ experiences. The experience of artistic creation, and 
arguably of aesthetic appreciation, involves a similar state of “flow.”24  
                                                 
21 Benoit Dayrat, ‘The Roots of Phylogeny: How Did Haeckel Build His Trees?’, 
Systematic Biology, vol. 52, no. 4 (2003), pp. 515-527.  
22 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (London: 
Paladin, 1971[1949]), pp. 22, 28, and 32.  
23 Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution, pp. 8-11. 
24 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1990). It is worth noting that this foregrounding of “flow” is not 
intended to support the hypothesis proposed by Fulvio Grosso and Peter Webster in The 
Dream on the Rock: Visions of Prehistory (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 
2013), that shamanic experiences caused by psychedelic drug ingestion are the origin 
point of religion, and crucial to the evolution of humanity. 
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Bellah’s argument then links the representation of unitive states through 
the four modes of developmental psychology (unitive, enactive, symbolic and 
conceptual) to narrative, in particular religious narrative that is closely related to 
ritual (in that it is often recited and enacted). He also notes that unitive states 
may be communal as well as individual; thus the Durkheimian notion of 
collective effervescence may also point to the power of that experience. Rituals, 
(including dance and music), are among the instances of art-making that Stephen 
Davies considered to be particularly ancient and to link contemporary humans 
with distant ancestors, Further, these sites of art-making served to confirm the 
mutually supportive relationship of aesthetic quality and functionality.25 Bellah 
joins ritual and enactive representation to narrative, positing that human selves 
are primarily narrative selves, exhibiting a debt to neuroscientist and 
anthropologist Terrence Deacon who (with Tyrone Cashman) has argued that 
narrative may have given rise to the notion of life after death. Evidence 
supporting this suggestion includes the fact that symbolism renders humans 
aware of the difference between the physical world and the symbolic order, as 
the “dualism of thing and word may engender metaphysical dualism.”26 This 
returns attention to play, in that storytelling can be a mode of playful 
representation, both entertaining and speculative. Given that literature is the art-
form most frequently claimed as an evolutionary adaptation, the centrality of 
narrative to religion is highly suggestive.  
It is hardly surprising that the two most common evolutionary positions 
argued for religion is that it is an adaptation or a spandrel, and the weaker 
explanations that it is either a vestige or entirely a product of culture are either 
dismissed outright or briefly noted.27 One complex area of difference between 
the evolutionary status of art and religion is the place of visual culture in each 
domain. Clearly, the visual dimension is crucial to the great majority of instances 
of art, but in modern (primarily textual) religions it is wont to be decried.28 Yet, 
as John Harvey notes, like the aesthetic sense (which is usually assumed to be 
positive, but which includes reactions of revulsion and disgust), religion has a 
lively culture of visual representation that is blasphemous, anti-religious, and 
very powerful.29 This incongruity reminds us that despite the fact that cognitive 
                                                 
25 Davies, The Artful Species, p. 26. 
26 Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution, pp. 102-103. 
27 Joseph Bulbulia, ‘The Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology of Religion’, Biology 
and Philosophy, vol. 19 (2004), pp. 655-686. 
28 John Harvey, ‘Visual Culture’, in The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in 
the Study of Religion, eds Michael Stausberg and Steven Engler (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2011), p. 504. 
29 Harvey, ‘Visual Culture’, pp. 516-519. 
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evolutionary biology seems to act as a revitalisation of Enlightenment 
universalism, denying the emphasis on historical particularity and cultural 
specificity that the plethora of postmodernist methodologies championed, it is 
open to difference. Bellah, for example, argues that different types of social and 
political organizations will foster different types of religion, 30  which is 
undeniable, and parallels the radical variety of art products available, from 
Indigenous Australian ritual objects, through Impressionist paintings, to 
Egyptian funerary architecture, and a myriad other forms.  
With regard to the evolutionary relationship between art and religion, 
despite the fact that it is not possible to prove that – if they are either adaptive or 
spandrels – these are heritable, it is worth noting that even in the twenty-first 
century (temporally a very long way from the origin of religion and art in the 
early development of humanity) certain religious practices, particularly those 
that relate to ritual, bear a strong resemblance to art practices, particularly body-
based performance art. Supporting this view is an emergent scholarly field that 
draws attention to the fundamental role that embodiment plays in all human 
experiences and cultural productions, including those phenomena that are 
traditionally conceived of as dis- or un-embodied, like cognition, religious 
inspiration, and artistic creation.31 It is also possible to argue that by teasing out 
the connections between ritual and performance art, the processes whereby the 
origin of religion-making and art-making were arrived at are made transparent. 
Such processes, via play and narrative and experiences of flow and B cognition, 
are solidified by repeat performance and acquire attendant meanings or beliefs 
that point to realms of experience that transcended the quotidian, giving them a 
religious or sacral quality.  
 
Boundary Work: Cognitivist and Evolutionary Biological Approaches to 
Traditional Humanities Fields 
To date, the social constructivist approach to religion has been a de facto 
orthodoxy among scholars in religious studies wishing to avoid theology and 
other ‘insider discourses’ and focus on ‘scientific’ explanations of the origins 
and functions of religions. The classic social constructivist formulation is Peter 
Berger’s account of human world-building. He argues that religion is a part of 
this larger meaning-making activity, which is effected through three steps; 
externalisation, objectivation, and internalization. He states that,  
[e]xternalization is the ongoing outpouring of human being [sic] 
                                                 
30 Jack Tsonis, ‘The Deep History of Ritual and Mythology: New Terrain in the Study 
of Religion’, Journal of Religious History, vol. 38, no. 1 (2014), pp. 118-119. 
31 Judith Kovach, ‘The Body as the Ground of Religion, Science, and Self’, Zygon, vol. 
37, no. 4 (2002), pp. 41-961. 
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into the world, both in the physical and the mental activity of men. 
Objectivation is the attainment of the products of this activity 
(again both physical and mental) of a reality that confronts its 
producers as a facticity external to and other than themselves. 
Internalization is the reappropriation by men of this same reality, 
transforming it once again from structures of the objective world 
into structures of the subjective consciousness. It is through 
externalization that society is a human product. It is through 
objectivation that society becomes a reality sui generis. It is 
through internalisation that man is a product of society.32  
This makes it clear that, in direct opposition to theological accounts of religious 
revelation, humans create the deities, mythological narratives, and supra-
empirical worlds that are the basic stuff of religion. 
The newer cognitive approaches to the study of religion are compatible 
with this model of world construction, in that narrative has been a constant focus 
in the cognitivist understanding how humans construct both their individual 
selves and the community. Tom Sjöblom has observed that narratives perceived 
to be relevant are powerful, and have been explained both as adaptations, as they 
deal with “the survival of the individual either directly by promoting social 
cohesion or indirectly by offering alternative scenarios to existential questions 
such as what happens to us after death,” and as spandrels because they are 
“invested with strategic information … [and] can be used as frames of reference 
in our everyday interactions,” or because humans have emotional commitments 
to them.33 Robert Bellah uses the psychologist Jerome Bruner’s notion of the 
storytelling self, which is supported by research into early childhood cognition 
that demonstrate that stories are comprehensible before any type of abstract 
reasoning can be grasped. Indeed, it may be claimed that the human development 
of abstract types of reasoning (from the hard sciences to systematic theology) is 
posited upon the building block of narrative. 34  Bruner’s developmental 
psychology reinforces Johan Huizinga’ valuation of play, especially play 
involving repetition, as basic training in the development of social relationships 
and reasoning (and, we might add, art practices, and religious world-building). 
The rise of cognitivist methodologies has been met with mixed reactions 
within religious studies and the wider humanities academic community. In part, 
                                                 
32 Peter Berger, The Social Reality of Religion (London: Faber and Faber, 1969[1967]), 
p. 4. Delete blank line below. 
33 Tom Sjöblom, ‘Pumping Intuitions: Religious Narratives and Emotional 
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34 Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 
p. 80. 
Religion-Marking and Art-Making 
 
Literature & Aesthetics 23 (2) December 2013 page 109 
this is because it is an example of the ‘hard’ sciences extending their reach into 
traditional humanities areas of research. This same unease is perceptible in 
Davies’ The Artful Species, although he stops short of dismissing evolutionary 
biological explanations of aesthetics and art objects. Aesthetics is not the first 
philosophical sub-discipline to be so challenged, nor will it be the last. 
Philosophy of mind has been largely displaced by neuroscience; a collection 
such as Anthony Flew’s classic anthology, Body, Mind, and Death, which 
appeared in 1964, and features extracts from such historical luminaries as Plato, 
Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes, and David Hume, appears almost comically 
dated when compared to Andy Clark’s Mindware: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Cognitive Science (2001), published less than forty years later.35 
Moreover, the merits of the differing scientific and humanities approaches to the 
subject of the mind and cognition have been battled out in publications, such as 
Maxwell Bennett et al, Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and 
Language.36 
The challenges posed by the hard sciences to traditional humanities 
disciplines like philosophy and religious studies are usefully interpreted in terms 
of the model of ‘boundary work’ proposed by Thomas F. Gieryn. In his 
pioneering 1983 article, Gieryn discussed such instances as the dispute between 
Christian creationists and Darwinian evolutionists as to the origin of human life, 
analyzing the strategies pursued by scientists in the nineteenth century to attain 
an authority comparable to that of religion in the publish sphere.37 In the twenty-
first century the situation has substantially changed, in that the dominance of 
religious institutions has diminished while the power of science (and its applied 
partner, technology) has grown. Thus scientists are increasingly keen to venture 
into fields that have traditionally been the exclusive preserve of other experts, 
including academic specialists in the humanities and visual and performing arts. 
There is substantial evidence that certain of the sciences (for example, biology, 
genetics, and psychology) have offered striking new perspectives and fresh, 
empirical evidence, on a range of (arguably stagnating) humanities disciplines.38 
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The sad truth, however, is that these fresh contributions are often rejected tout 
court by academics engaged in boundary work that is in essence concerned with 
shoring up their particular fiefdoms within the humanities. 
 
Conclusion 
Stephen Davies’ The Artful Species considers the impact of cognitive 
evolutionary biology on a traditional sub-field of Western philosophy, and 
cautiously concludes that aesthetic experience and the impulse toward art-
making may be either adaptive or spandrels; that is, he acknowledges that there 
is merit in the forays that scientists have made into traditional humanities fields. 
Before the rise of cognitive approaches, the social sciences had already 
questioned the traditional assumptions of aesthetics, and argued that aesthetics 
was compromised (as a term, a sub-field of philosophy, and a praxis) by a lack 
of recognition of the essentialism, psychologisation, and elitism of traditional 
approaches to art. The theological assumption that the art-making is akin to the 
action of God in the creation of the universe, which romanticises the figure of 
the artist as godlike, and the presumption that art objects are perceived to be 
beautiful (aesthetically pleasing) across cultures and historical eras were also 
critiqued.39  In the 1970s the subfield of aesthetics came perilously close to 
fragmentation due to these methodological wars between scholars, both 
traditional and contemporary. In the early twenty-first century, the critical 
response to Davies’ book suggests that new approaches and new evidence (such 
as is provided by cognitivists or evolutionary biologists) has the ability to 
reinvigorate an enervated field, and restore its relevance for contemporary 
philosophy and art history and theory.  
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